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In History, Philippine Issues, Political Economy, Political Theory, Politics, Youth on November 18, 2010 at 1:41 am

An Analysis of Philippine Socio-Political Realities and Opportunities Towards Mobilization for Radicalization of Democracy

Hansley A. Juliano

(Note: Originally a final requirement for the course “PoS 160: Current Issues and Problems in Philippine Government and Politics” under Ms. Joy G. Aceron, this is an expanded form of the writeup with initial ideas for tactics on mobilization and the social considerations attached therein. The themes will be revisited once further research has been conducted.)

Among the literature that has attempted to analyze and understand the development of the Philippine nation, its society and its component people, it is supposedly only Jose Maria Sison who was able to present a comprehensive framework for political change in the country via his seminal Philippine Society and Revolution (published under the pseudonym of” Amado Guerrero” in 1970). Characterizing the Philippine socio-political landscape as “a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society” via its collective colonial heritage of Spanish frontier-building among the vast East Indies and the United States’ avowed deceptive program of “Benevolent Assimilation,” the publication therefore pronounces that political change can only come through a “a national-democratic revolution, a revolution seeking the liberation of the Filipino people from foreign and feudal oppression and exploitation.” (Guerrero 1970, 77).

While the aforementioned tactics for revolution have been espoused for the past forty years by the Communist Party of the Philippines in its employment of “protracted people’s war,” we must also note that this line of thinking has brought the struggle nowhere near its objectives of capturing state mechanisms and instilling a new socio-political culture amongst the Filipino populace. Opting instead to cultivate pocket areas of resistance that only serve to isolate these areas from the national government and political life, this mode of proceeding has only accomplished in branding them to be terrorists and incapable of participating in the liberal-democratic space of the Philippines. The National Democratic Front has seemingly recognized this and has already been placing higher priority on “political struggle and the urban arena” in their efforts to mobilization, despite avowing the primacy of armed struggle and the rural pockets (Quimpo 2008, 71). Nonetheless, the undemocratic nature of their struggle and rhetoric remains: a “totalizing” one which “viewed all other significant struggles, such as those for women’s rights, minority rights, and environmental well-being, as aspects of the broader struggle against fascism and imperialism, which was ‘central’ and thus claimed strategic priority” (Bello 1993, 13). If any, such a mentality has been deemed counterproductive by Chantal Mouffe in expressing that “we need to establish different forms of articulation among democratic struggles and no one element of struggle should have a privileged position.” (Mouffe 1993, 113).

Philippine politics has been derided to have always been a personality- and patronage-based ball game where it is only the elites who are benefitting from the “spoils of contestation” through rampant use of state mechanisms to appropriate public funds for themselves. That local and national politics has been inextricably tied to the caprice of elites who do not seem to truly use their hegemonic positionality towards the reconfiguration of the socio-political setup has undermined the value of parliamentary struggle. The necessity of a highly-inclusive yet highly-polarized struggle for democratization that will allow articulation of people’s interests have been increasingly problematic that the common Filipino citizen no longer has any idea of how to actually participate in a genuine politics of change.

This review, therefore, seeks to reframe the current conflict of ideas and perspectives regarding how socio-political change could truly be achieved in the primacy of the liberal-democratic elite within the Philippines through the employment of radical democratic, socialist and even anarchistic tactics. In acknowledging the necessity of operating between institutionalized and formal politics as well as revolutionizing public participation using unorthodox means, I argue that political participation be centered around active contestation of systems that curtail social justice and the re-institution of a counter-culture of “communal determinism.” This mode of social organization, rooting from the tradition of Jose Rizal’s La Liga Filipina, is intended to create citizens who are capable of living and rationalizing for themselves yet are willing to participate in massive and well-planned collective struggles that will be able to integrate all concerns of human life and development, without the horrible and anti-democratic underpinnings of “tolerance” that inevitably makes people’s interest clash. This mode of participation shall be understood via the following discussions. We first employ an analysis of the Philippine political sphere as a colonial and middle-class project which explains the tendency to reaction of local sectors employing increasing isolationism in the name of “cultural preservation” that endangers democratic consolidation. From this, I highlight the problematic nature of a flawed uncompromisingly-nationalist and reason-based rhetoric employed in democratic state consolidation, governing the action of social movements and civil society who in turn contribute to the increasing privatization of political participation. With such threats to the development of an active citizenry, I finally argue for the development of parallel modes of struggle criss-crossing within and without social movements and state apparatuses, in order to advance a thorough contestation of the dominant liberal-democratic state towards a social democratic setup.

Violent Intrusion

The varying cultures and social groupings that existed within the Philippine islands (particularly the barangay) in pre-colonial times have been operating under modes of production that are operating within hermeneutics of production and exchange. Thriving industries of agriculture, public and private landholding, animal husbandry, mining and weaving supported local development. Domestic and foreign trade was flourishing as well, with the barter system allowing for equitable exchange of consumables and valuables (Agoncillo 1990, 52). This socio-economic setup is visibly oriented towards the maintenance of a seasonal and stable means of livelihood and resource protection. Obviously, there is no concept of production centred towards accumulation as the varying systems of capitalism have outlined. The federal nature of pre-colonial Philippine politics (a label that, while contestable, I will use for purposes of this argument to refer to the fact that the barangays co-exist peacefully with treaties and are open to cooperation with each other in particular undertakings) allowed for checks and balances between localities’ interests, assuring that no particular barangay will seek to extend boundaries at the prejudice of others.

This backfired during the advent of Spanish colonization, where the divide et impera strategy of the conquistadores deprived the barangays of a consolidated stand against maintaining their independence (entering into alliances with the foreign settlers [such as Sikatuna] for purposes of protection and support). With the inclusion of the noble clans into the colonial state apparatus as cabezas de barangay, the colonization effort was given further legitimacy amongst the populace. The intrusion of feudal and capitalist production within the territories of the Philippine islands upset the natural and communal balance that our ancestors have sought to protect. The reconfiguration of the local economic setup, while it was able to develop agriculture production more efficiently, it was inevitably instrumental in widening the gap between social classes. Rapid economic development and Philippine participation in global free trade was only actualized in the late 19th century (the Manila-Acapulco Galleon Trade notwithstanding). The emergence of a mestizo and indio middle class (led in the national mythology by the so-called ilustrados like Rizal, Del Pilar and Ponce) allowed for the advancement of a nationalist project that gave birth to the 1896 Philippine Revolution. The key involvement of the United States of America in the struggle (influenced by the outbreak of the Spanish-American War), while tactically vital in assuring Spanish surrender to the forces of General Emilio Aguinaldo, ultimately paved the way for the institutionalization of American presence culminating in the Filipino-American War and US colonization of the Islands.

Reformation of the system towards consolidating American hegemony was enforced by the creative blending of disciplinary mechanisms of colonial state apparatuses, as McCoy, Scarano and Johnson (2009, 15) outlined:

Within the vast array of U.S. colonial programs, policing was arguably the most successful in situ and the most significant in its metropolitan resonance. Confronted with intractable Philippine resistance, which persisted for over a decade, the U.S. colonial regime fused the centralized Spanish imperial police with America’s advanced information systems to create an Argus-eyed colonial force, the Philippines Constabulary. Its unprecedented capacity for mass surveillance proved a bellwether for parallel domestic developments.

The thorough implementation of governmentality (1) in colonial policy instituted path dependency and the primacy of private-controlled capital in developing the fledgling Philippine economy primed to compete in the global market (as mandated by the Tydings-McDuffee Act). Its articulation in the creation of the Philippine Commonwealth under the presidency of Manuel Luis Quezon prefigured the current neo-liberal democratic Philippine state, which is arguably a middle- and upper-class project that simply co-opted colonial apparatuses. The same logic, in a sense, also characterized the First Republic of Aguinaldo, which was forced to maintain colonial bureaucratic offices in order to maintain consolidated service delivery towards sectors of Philippine society they can reach, but nonetheless reinforced social strata between the ilustrados and the common indio folk.

Moreover, while the 1896 Revolution did articulate and advance a national community, it is inevitable Tagalog-centric and as such has a tendency to alienate other local cultures, specifically the hegemonic Cebuano majority in the Visayas and the dominant Moro denomination in Mindanao. (2) The maintenance of such setups (despite efforts to decentralize issue articulation beyond locality affiliations) allowed for the entrenchment of local elites using Rousseauvian “state of nature” rhetoric in order to maintain their localities’ isolation from the Philippine democratic state, which their constituencies do not approve of yet are powerless to do anything about. The case of Ali Dimaporo’s presentation of himself as a Maranao datu in promoting authoritarian terror through his private army Barracuda calls this to mind, with the most notorious case being the Ampatuans in Maguindanao whose name now goes down in infamy for perpetuating the Maguindanao Massacre of November 23, 2009. (3) Nevertheless, to consider this phenomenon as solely Moro-based would be unfounded, as patronage politics of authoritarian terror has been part of life in Caloocan City under the Asistios.

“Beyond Fiction”

A majority of Philippine nationalist literature which has entered popular consciousness has been prone to presenting the struggles as a uniform, consolidated and united effort of people from all walks of life to build a nation out of abstract motivations. (4) While these perspectives are definitely commendable for a mythic presentation of communal affiliation, it is precisely this fictiveness that asks us to question it and go beyond its dictates as to how we should engage in work for socio-political change. There is a need to depart from the standard nationalist rhetoric which usually blames “weak national integration” as the key problem which allows local elites to perpetuate unjust social structures that the sovereign national government is incapable of contesting. The existing state apparatus maintains the fictive operation of creating the uniformity of the race, a project which Hardt and Negri detailed succinctly (2000, 103-4):

The identity of the people was constructed on an imaginary plane that hid and/or eliminated differences, and this corresponded on the practical plane to racial subordination and social purification. The second fundamental operation in the construction of the people, which is facilitated by the first, is the eclipse of internal differences through the representation of the whole population by a hegemonic group, race, or class. The representative group is the active agent that stands behind the effectiveness of the concept of nation.

This imposition to subscribe to a fictional image of the citizen serving the nation, instead of truly shaping the citizen to be an active participant in the creation of spaces for participation in the public space, has actually created them to be “docile bodies” who “become elements that may be placed, moved articulated on others.” (Foucault 1995, 164). The dictates of nationalism can be so overwhelming that they can and will centralize the image of the nation as vital at the risk of alienating other equally-important social concerns, as well as endanger the very conception of civil liberties. (5) Of similar importance, as well, is the need to abandon the long-standing antagonism of political actors to religious participation by the ruling middle- and upper-class. Rooting from the anti-clerical and free-thinking tradition of the Propaganda Movement, the Masonic roots of the Philippine Revolution, as well as the continuous implication of various religious actors in social injustice, the tendency to insist separation of Church and State is a favourite ad hominem tactic of secular and partisan groups whenever religious actors (specifically the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church) would dare venture their opinions. This persistence on wholesale secularism and glorification of the nation, as could be seen, did not spell well for the maintenance of a supposedly pluralistic democratic space, and has initiated a spreading mode of thinking amongst the upper- and middle-class members of the electronic herd (6) to discredit democratic practice in itself, promoting cosmopolitanism.

These realities asks us to see how the mutual inability of social movements in the local level to penetrate the conflicting space of national interest consolidation, as well as nationalist, “good governance” politics’ incapability to present its agenda to a captive electorate driven by patronage and rent-seeking, is keeping people from participating in a widespread movement for structural change. As Patricio Abinales noted in light of the failure of most social movements and civil society efforts (particularly Leftist actors such as Akbayan and the Communist Party of the Philippines) to advance advocacies in the local level (2008, 91):

… [P]rogressive forces can only remain relevant nationally if they rebuild locally. This means shifting their resources and personnel to the painstaking process of building chapters and organizations at the barangay, town, city and provincial levels, focusing their investigative and analytical skills to understand the political economy of these areas (instead of wasting time and paper on national evaluations), all towards determining the proper long-term strategy to win (seize?) power in these battlegrounds.

Moreover, a campaign for “clean politics” (especially manifested in the highly-electoralist [and therefore prone to inefficiency] campaigns for electoral reform) inevitably polarizes social classes, wherein the “burgis portrayal of the poor as people driven only by material need, as people without principles… provided the basis for voter education in 2001 and that seemed to pique so many of the respondents” (Schaffer 2009, 141). Class sensibility remains a highly-palatable framework of analysis in analyzing Philippine politics due to the political environment’s compatibility to coercion theory (7), and this peculiar obsession with it somewhat hampers inter-class and inter-advocacy dialogue for interest consolidation (as is the case in the 2010 presidential polls when supposed “populist” candidate Manuel Villar clashed with reformist candidate Benigno Aquino III, a member of the Philippine elite).

The More, The Merrier

Strategies for social change, according to literature and experience, have been concentrated towards social movements and civil society that have succeeded in marketing political participation as a decidedly individually-determined participation which should serve the “pursuit of private happiness” by citizens. In fact, one can see the development of the Philippine Bishops-Businessmen’s Conference (PBBC) as the emergence of “a countermeasure against, rather than an extension of, [radical] pressures from below [the social hierarchy]” (Hedman 2006, 106). That interest articulations (as shown by the dynamics of the party-list system) are somewhat concentrated on advancing gain for socio-economic enterprises and not radical change of political institutions towards a more equitable social arrangement raises questions on the capability to advance more responsive politics. We can subvert this trend by precisely entering these structures of private mobilization and yet maintain parallel linkages of advancing interests and ideologies beyond co-opted spaces. Civil society’s avowed non-partisanship (something it arguably “obsessively” clings on to) might therefore be counterproductive in the long run, as the maintenance of a politics based on conviction of non-affiliation is “inevitably totalitarian”, since it “sits uneasily in a realm whose medium is action and whose constitutive elements are therefore those of contingency, opportunity, invention and compromise” (Brown 2001, 94).

It would be definitely important to harness the energies of perceived “idle sectors” (loosely defined in this paper as “sectors who are not directly involved in political participation and are prone to not having any political stance”) which are more vulnerable to being co-opted in the production of the neo-liberal social setup in order to promote this long-awaited counterculture. While not an exhaustive list, these proposals for dealing with sectors might allow us to rethink tactics that could be employed:

  • Pre-University/Out-of-School Youth: Arguably comprised of students in the intermediate and high school level, they are perceived as the most vulnerable sector due to their inexperience regarding communal participation. Most students are brought up in a sanitized environment via an educational system which forms them to prioritize the pursuit of individual happiness over communal participation. There is a tendency within educational curricula to deride review and analysis of political issues with lens partial to critical analysis or advocating social justice, viewing them as “dangerous” and “partial to disturb the peace.” Forms of communal participation and development taught to them center on liberalist values of charity, bourgeois values of conformity and maintenance of state-defined peace and order, which tend to demonize social movements as “de-stabilizers” and organized labour as “bad for business and economic sustainability.” In convincing students from this sector to take a stand on political issues, it might be important to frame it by appealing to perspectives on communality, altruism, sustainability, national pride and commitment to others’ welfare as a universally-acceptable tenet. Political participation, as well as the justification of social movements via these perspectives, might convince them to contribute in their own little way regarding these advocacies. Contributions could be related to framing their interests towards fun activities that benefit particular sectors (such as reach-out activities and educational programs for the empowerment of vulnerable sectors), while capable of consolidating popular culture in order to make it more attractive. Consolidation of cosmopolitan tastes and lower-rung pop culture (contemporarily labelled jejemon) would be very helpful. Convincing must be conducted in relation to their parents and household in order to promote civil dialogue (see Domestic Managers below).
  • University Youth: Being more often than not recently exposed to critical analysis of societal arrangements, they are usually more receptive of analyzing social issues, participate in mobilizations and articulate particular advocacies; this might only hold true, however, for universities that employ the study of liberal arts. Students of science and business, by comparison, are not that receptive (if not even antagonistic) to dealing with political issues due to their corporatist mindset of the necessity of elite knowledge to conduct reforms and revolutionizing the fields of engagement as well. The perceived slant of the social sciences and humanities to critique them do not help matters, in a sense. It would be therefore important to frame issues that involve, even at a marginal or superficial level, considerations of technological capability as a means to convince them that their field of study/interest affects social setups greatly and, therefore, should convince them to stake a stand for sustainability and justice as well. Aforementioned tactics for attracting their youthful sensibilities in the Pre-University Youth section similarly apply.
  • Informal Settlers: Formerly known as “squatters” and the stereotypical image of the masa, informal settlers are time and again accused of being prone to patronage politics as well as criminal activities. While formerly a grave problem exclusive to the Greater Manila Area, the advent of urbanization in many commercial hubs in the country also contributed to their rise. Due to unsustainable living conditions and the propensity to licentiousness encouraged by these, people who are satisfied in their area are very much apathetic while those who desire social mobility are too focused on sustaining their day-to-day lives that they think participating in public issues is a burden. It would be important to frame issues as to how their very position of poverty is a product of unjust social structures, while simultaneously empowering them to participate in activities that allow them to earn a decent living. Cooperative business can be conducive in allowing them economic sustainability while making them more participative in social analysis.
  • White-collar/Contractual Labour: Driven by similar desires for social mobility, white-collared labour is less conducive to union organization due to their desire to maintain tenure and support their social obligations (to their families for example). Contractual labour, precisely due to their transient nature, does not allow them to even entrench themselves in the production sector they participate in. The seeming antagonism of organized blue-collar labour to their plight does little to change their perception of political participation as ultimately vain. It would be therefore important to frame political analysis with regards to their sectors’ part in promoting (or indeed, hindering) sustainability for national growth. Advocating regularization of contractual workers and popularizing other modes of income-generation would be helpful as well.
  • Domestic Managers: Particularly comprised of home-based parents and housekeepers, their entrenchment in the domestic setting makes them vulnerable to dismissing political savvy as important to their lives. It would be important, therefore, to frame domestic necessities (like the price of common goods) as also affected by socio-political realities and therefore should make them more conscious and appreciative of economic policies as mandated by political frameworks. They are especially important to be formed to critical thinking as they bring up their children into becoming socially-conscious and participative citizens, more so in their developing years (see Pre-University Youth and University Youth above).

“Si est tutus, est non iustus”

In this light, therefore, it would be similarly necessary to disengage ourselves from middle-class liberal democracy that serves bare life and begin participating in a politics that is open to contingencies and alliances which are not solely based on personal expediency but a holistic ideological formation of citizenship. It would be important, in a sense, to acknowledge that “identity is rediscovered in a diachronic totality: an inexorable succession of stages allows existing social reality to be divided into phenomena that are necessary or contingent, according to the stage of that society ‘s approaching maturity.” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, 21). In the articulation of sides and interests which will be upheld by a truly democratic movement, one must acknowledge that political realities are not as static as what occurs in the natural sciences, and therefore one’s ideas of participation should as well never be static.

Coming from these discussions, therefore, it would be necessary to conduct an intensive campaign for political change that is expansive yet micro-based in its approaches to dealing with incumbent and ambient socio-political crises. Social movements and civil society’s capabilities and technologies towards mobilization should be democratized and be made accessible to all regardless of positioning and clashing perspectives. As Laclau and Mouffe would once again reiterate (2001, 54):

The unfulfilled democratic tasks are simply a stepping-stone for the working class to advance towards its strictly class objectives. In this way , the conditions are created not only for the specificity of the hegemonic link to be systematically conjured away (given that its factual or circumstantial character eschews any conceptual construction), but also for its disappearance to be made invisible. Indeed, the insertion o f the hegemonic relation into a narrative of adjustments and recompositions , into a succession which cannot be subsumed under the principle of repetition , seems to give a meaning to that conceptually evanescent presence.

There must be an acknowledgment that, despite the roots of class struggle mobilization coming from an economistic view of human relations, struggles via which class interests would be marketed in order to mobilize as much forces as possible would be rooted in the contingency of pressing issues in the public space. In a sense, the tradition inaugurated via the EDSA Revolution is a perfect example of how interests, albeit coming from different positionalities and reaches from hegemonic status are nonetheless capable of articulating coordinated movements towards democratization. It would also be important to question and contest the increasingly “bureaucratizing” tendencies of state apparatuses that focus excessively on national housekeeping that render public spaces of accountability less transparent and open to democratic contestation of interest groups. The necessity to highlight that economic development should be preceded by democratic development is vital, since “experience shows that democracy often flourishes in poor countries. Moreover, evidence reveals that countries frequently remain poor precisely because they retain autocratic political structures. A development first strategy thus risks perpetuating the deadly cycle of poverty, conflict, and oppression” (Siegle, 2004, 71).

The employment of an interweaving of national, local and social framing of issues would be important in order to wage a “viral campaign” that has the potential to contest (and eventually neutralize) the dominant neo-liberal capitalist nation-state in the advent of a more socially-democratic setup. While mapping out historical progression is always suspicious, I argue nonetheless that the institution of more socially-democratic environments can be a stepping stone towards the cultivation of a culture of citizenship that is not tied to formal institutions prone to subverting the interests of individual and community simultaneously. Through such means, the liberty and development of the individual is maintained, while affiliation towards their communities, whether it is in the locality and the nation-state, is grounded in an active stakeholder mentality and not simply as a subject beholden to given and seemingly-incontestable state apparatuses.


  1. The concept is best elaborated upon by Michel Foucault in a text entitled, unsurprisingly, “Governmentality” (1991, 92): “The art of government, as becomes apparent in this literature, is essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce economy – that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family (which a good father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children and servants) and of making the family fortunes prosper – how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family into the management of the state.”
  2. Cultural disconnect has always been a key issue among peoples in the southern regions of the Philippines, such as how Cebuanos are prone to proclaiming that their native language Cebuano should have been the national language. A more malevolent and damaging case would be the persistence of secessionism in Mindanao, as campaigned by the Moro National Liberation Front during the 1970s led by Nur Misuari, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front up to this day, and allegedly even the terrorist network-affiliated Abu Sayyaf.
  3. Interestingly, scholar Paul Hutchcroft has already called to our attention the possibilities of the Ampatuans using their power with visible extravagance since early 2008, what with their proximity to power and then-incumbent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s indebtedness to them for sweeping the votes of Maguindanao in their favor (2008, 150).
  4. This, of course, has been put to lie by the very fact that the primary instigator of the 1896 Revolution, Andres Bonifacio, has been executed by factions of the Katipunan who wished to install Emilio Aguinaldo as the more competent leader outside and against the democratic process.
  5. In a sense, one may be asked to suspect the introduction of a Bill of Duties (new Article V) in the proposals of the 2006 Constitutional Commission (Concom) to overhaul the 1987 Constitution as serving this particular purpose, further intensifying the intrusion of state functions into the space of individual freedom (as could be seen in this matrix prepared by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism:, accessed 15 October, 2010).
  6. Originally coined by Thomas Friedman in The Lexus and The Olive Tree, it refers to the sectors of society who have access to technological and financial resources that they dictate the structuration of the global market. I appropriate this term for the purposes of referring to a school of free-thinkers in the Internet (who thrive such discussion hubs such as and who are quite venal in their upholding of neo-liberal politics and active promotion of discrediting nationalism and democracy per se.
  7. That is to say, a view that “pictures society as primarily a structure of power, and views inequality as simply
    the outcome of power relationships over time among individuals and interest groups.” (Carroll 1984, 35).
  8. In a minor study on party-list groups I conducted for the Ateneo School of Government during the eve of the May 2010 elections (see PoP 2010 Volume 2, Issue 1), random sampling of 10 out of 112 party lists showed that only a minority of parties are actually using the system as a means of advancing ideological and sectoral representation, with all samples being identified to be lee-ways for incumbent local and national politicians affiliated with the Arroyo regime to garner seats in Congress.



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Bello, Walden. “The dual crisis of the Philippine progressive movement,” in John Gershman and Walden Bello (eds.), Reexamining the and Renewing the Philippine Progressive Vision. Quezon City: Forum for Philippine Alternatives, 1993. 11-29.

Brown, Wendy. Politics out of History. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Carroll, John J., S.J. “Social Theory and Social Change in the Philippines,” in Pulso Vol. 1, No. 1. Institute on Church and Social Issues. 1984. 34-47.

Foucault, Michel. “Governmentality,” in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Trans. Rosi Braidotti and revised by Colin Gordon. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991. 87-104.

_____________. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated from the French by Alan Sheridan, 2nd ed. Vintage Books, Random House: New York, 1995.

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Hutchcroft, Paul D. “The Arroyo Imbroglio in the Philippines,” in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 19, No. 1. January 2008. 141-155.

Juliano, Hansley. “PANIC AT THE DISCO: A review of the Party-List System and 10 Party-List groups” in Poolitikang Pinoy (PoP) 2010, Vol. 2, No. 1. Ateneo School of Government: May 2010. 1-4.

Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 2nd ed. New York: Verso, 2001.

McCoy, Alfred, Francisco A. Scarano and Courtney Johnson. “On the Tropic of Cancer: Transitions and Transformations in the U.S. Imperial State,” in McCoy and Scarano (eds.), Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009. 3-33.

Mouffe, Chantal. (interviewed by Mike Power). “A Radical Left Project?” in Wilks and Stuart (eds.), Talking About Tomorrow: A New Radical Politics. London: Pluto Press, 1993. 109-116.

Quimpo, Nathan Gilbert. Contested Democracy and the Left in the Philippines After Marcos. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2008.

Schaffer, Frederic Charles. The Hidden Costs of Clean Election Reform. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2009.

Siegle, Joseph T., Michael M. Weinstein, and Morton H. Halperin. “Why Democracies Excel” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5. September-October 2004. 57-71.

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